Objective truth: does it exist?

[dahduh]

Much of the whole atheist/theist debate revolves around what is 'objectively true'. Given that we perceive a complicated world through a very limited set of senses and are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases, the whole idea of 'objective truth' is a slippery one.

So I'd like to offer a very simple definition: Something is objectively true, if and only if there is information associated with it that can be independently obtained.

It all relates to information. If multiple inquirers can extract the same information from something, and do it in a way that is manifestly not from their method of measurement or information previously shared, then that information must be coming from something that can deliver up that information - something that is, by definition, objectively true.

Just note the proviso: the information cannot have been previously shared, and it must not be a product of the method of measurement (which is just a hidden way of previously sharing information).

Does anyone have a problem with this definition? Are there any theists who would like to apply it to the question of whether God exists?

[naz]

Nov 30, 2009 18:49:15 GMT dahduh said:

Much of the whole atheist/theist debate revolves around what is 'objectively true'. Given that we perceive a complicated world through a very limited set of senses and are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases, the whole idea of 'objective truth' is a slippery one.

So I'd like to offer a very simple definition: Something is objectively true, if and only if there is information associated with it that can be independently obtained.

It all relates to information. If multiple inquirers can extract the same information from something, and do it in a way that is manifestly not from their method of measurement or information previously shared, then that information must be coming from something that can deliver up that information - something that is, by definition, objectively true.

Just note the proviso: the information cannot have been previously shared, and it must not be a product of the method of measurement (which is just a hidden way of previously sharing information).

Does anyone have a problem with this definition? Are there any theists who would like to apply it to the question of whether God exists?

I'm not clear on what you mean by "it must not be a product of the method of measurement ". please elaborate.

[dahduh]

Nov 30, 2009 18:56:49 GMT naz said:

I'm not clear on what you mean by "it must not be a product of the method of measurement ". please elaborate.

For example, when Lowell was drawing his canals on Mars, it is thought what he might really have been drawing an optical illusion that results when you view dots through a fuzzy instrument - they tend to look like they are joined by lines. So while he was reliably drawing the same canals, and a couple of other people were too, it was simply an artifact of their method of measurement.

[naz]

Nov 30, 2009 19:27:31 GMT dahduh said:

Nov 30, 2009 18:56:49 GMT naz said:

I'm not clear on what you mean by "it must not be a product of the method of measurement ". please elaborate.

For example, when Lowell was drawing his canals on Mars, it is thought what he might really have been drawing an optical illusion that results when you view dots through a fuzzy instrument - they tend to look like they are joined by lines. So while he was reliably drawing the same canals, and a couple of other people were too, it was simply an artifact of their method of measurement.

Okay, got it.

[naz]

Nov 30, 2009 18:49:15 GMT dahduh said:

Much of the whole atheist/theist debate revolves around what is 'objectively true'. Given that we perceive a complicated world through a very limited set of senses and are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases, the whole idea of 'objective truth' is a slippery one.

First off I reject the categories "subjective" and "objective" as absolutes. I do see them as being relatively true within a certain framework of observation.

So I'd like to offer a very simple definition: Something is objectively true, if and only if there is information associated with it that can be independently obtained.

I can go with that.

It all relates to information. If multiple inquirers can extract the same information from something, and do it in a way that is manifestly not from their method of measurement or information previously shared, then that information must be coming from something that can deliver up that information - something that is, by definition, objectively true.

It's tricky because as you just pointed out methods of measurement can produce false impressions.

Does anyone have a problem with this definition? Are there any theists who would like to apply it to the question of whether God exists?

I have often pointed out that spiritual experiences can be objective in the sense that they can be matching subjective experiences. The same type of experiential "information" can be extracted by different individuals.

[ydoaPs]

Truth is simple. A proposition is true if it correlates to reality.

[dahduh]

Nov 30, 2009 19:36:30 GMT naz said:

I have often pointed out that spiritual experiences can be objective in the sense that they can be matching subjective experiences. The same type of experiential "information" can be extracted by different individuals.

Your point on 'objective' being dependent on a common framework of observation is taken; but that's no more an objection that two people using the same language to communicate in.

As far as spiritual experiences are concerned: tricky. Yes, it is commonly reported by people having near death experiences that they 'see a light'. But is this just their optical cortex closing down, like an old-fashioned TV's picture would collapsed to dot before blinking out? Or is it a shared cultural exception? We have here the shared information or artifact of measurement problem again.

What we really need is evidence that information obtained from spiritual experiences are not previously shared or artifacts. So far as I know this hasn't been demonstrated yet.

[vazscep]

Nov 30, 2009 19:27:31 GMT dahduh said:

Nov 30, 2009 18:56:49 GMT naz said:

I'm not clear on what you mean by "it must not be a product of the method of measurement ". please elaborate.

For example, when Lowell was drawing his canals on Mars, it is thought what he might really have been drawing an optical illusion that results when you view dots through a fuzzy instrument - they tend to look like they are joined by lines. So while he was reliably drawing the same canals, and a couple of other people were too, it was simply an artifact of their method of measurement.

I haven't read any philosophy of science, but I've read that many (most?) philosophers of science think this problem goes all the way down. There is no such thing as a "pure measurement" or a "pure observation". Every method of measurement implies more theory. That theory might be justified by further measurements, but those measurements then presuppose more theory and so it goes on. This, I believe, is the problem of theory-ladeness. It means that for any scientific observation, there should always be some room to call it a mere artifact of the method of measurement.

I believe the criticism goes all the way back to Galileo whose observations of Venus met a criticism that he had no reliable theory of optics to explain his measuring apparatus.

[dahduh]

Dec 1, 2009 11:16:46 GMT vazscep said:

Nov 30, 2009 19:27:31 GMT dahduh said:

For example, when Lowell was drawing his canals on Mars, it is thought what he might really have been drawing an optical illusion that results when you view dots through a fuzzy instrument - they tend to look like they are joined by lines. So while he was reliably drawing the same canals, and a couple of other people were too, it was simply an artifact of their method of measurement.

I haven't read any philosophy of science, but I've read that many (most?) philosophers of science think this problem goes all the way down. There is no such thing as a "pure measurement" or a "pure observation". Every method of measurement implies more theory. That theory might be justified by further measurements, but those measurements then presuppose more theory and so it goes on. This, I believe, is the problem of theory-ladeness. It means that for any scientific observation, there should always be some room to call it a mere artifact of the method of measurement.

I believe the criticism goes all the way back to Galileo whose observations of Venus met a criticism that he had no reliable theory of optics to explain his measuring apparatus.

The philosophical objection of theory-ladenness can be pushed to the point where one concludes that nothing is knowable at all (here's a nice little summary of theory-ladenness here for those who need a refresher).

One point however: we are creatures of this world. We are not mere philosophical beings spirited into this world compelled to question the reality of everything we perceive; we come with built-in hardware with which we interact with the world. Our hardware always works correctly (or so it seems). As for our theories, they are merely models of reality, and whether our theories are correct or not is entirely beside the point: reality ticks along just fine without them.

What this implies is that we have a rigorous, concrete foundation for the term "true". Something is 'true' if it models reality accurately. If a measurement is consistent with our model, and our model is consistent with reality, then that measurement is consistently true. Lowell's measurements were not true because they were inconsistent with photographs taken by Voyager. Kepler's measurements were true because they were consistent. Of course, because at any point in time our knowledge is limited we may think something true today that is found to be false tomorrow; that is why we have to slap the word 'provisional' in front of every model-based assertion of truth.

Now it may in principle be possible to formulate a model that appears to be consistent with reality but in fact is based on some undetectable measurement artifact, being consistent with every other aspect of our model. But I would argue that even if this is the case, it is irrelevant. It is like arguing for a God that is undetectable and unprovable; ok, so maybe it exists, but then so what? It doesn't matter anyway. What this equates to, in fact, is just having multiple model of reality that are homologous with one another.

Note that the world didn't have to be this way! The world could have been something impossible to model, like totally random, or dependent on unobservable influences (and maybe it is, when we observe the edge of the universe and witness phenomena influenced by things forever beyond our event horizon). But it turns out - and this is a purely empirical observation - that the world is pretty regular and can be modeled, and that information can be consistently extracted from objects in the world - in other words, 'objective truths' really do exist. And we are rooted in this reality, not in some philosophical abstraction.

[vazscep]

lol. Actually, it was Paul Newall's excellent introductions to philosophy of science and the Galileo affair that I first came across the idea of theory ladenness. Are you a member of TGL?

Anyway, I can't see anything like a "concrete foundation" for the term "true" in your post.

If a measurement is consistent with our model, and our model is consistent with reality, then that measurement is consistently true.

How do we determine if a model is consistent with reality? It seems to me that all we can do is examine its consistency with itself and our measurements.

The only real fact that we seem to have here is that it is possible to form theories and gather measurements which are largely consistent with one another. This is great and all, but I'm not seeing any interesting definitions of objective truth implied by this. But then, do we need any? You say that reality gets by fine without science. It looks to me that science gets by fine without having to worry about any problem of theory ladenness.

[dahduh]

Dec 1, 2009 14:20:06 GMT vazscep said:

lol. Actually, it was Paul Newall's excellent introductions to philosophy of science and the Galileo affair that I first came across the idea of theory ladenness. Are you a member of TGL?

Nope. Merely a dabbler.

How do we determine if a model is consistent with reality? It seems to me that all we can do is examine its consistency with itself and our measurements.

And that's all we have to do; ensure consistency between the model and reality.

The only real fact that we seem to have here is that it is possible to form theories and gather measurements which are largely consistent with one another. This is great and all, but I'm not seeing any interesting definitions of objective truth implied by this. But then, do we need any? You say that reality gets by fine without science. It looks to me that science gets by fine without having to worry about any problem of theory ladenness.

That's exactly my point; simply having a model consistent with itself and with reality is good enough. We don't have to get into abstruse questions about whether the model is objectively true in the metaphysical sense because if a model is perfectly consistent with all evidence, then the question is moot. And it provides a framework in which we can decide the truth or falsity of any statement about the world around us.

[naz]

That's exactly my point; simply having a model consistent with itself and with reality is good enough. We don't have to get into abstruse questions about whether the model is objectively true in the metaphysical sense because if a model is perfectly consistent with all evidence, then the question is moot. And it provides a framework in which we can decide the truth or falsity of any statement about the world around us.

Philosophy aside, from a purely practical standpoint, I agree.

[vazscep]

Dec 1, 2009 17:31:36 GMT dahduh said:

And that's all we have to do; ensure consistency between the model and reality.

You're going too far there. I said: "It seems to me that all we can do is examine its consistency with itself and our measurements" There is no mention of consistency with reality here. How do you get consistency with reality from consistency with measurement? It appears you are assuming that measurement is reality, but that would be denying theory ladenness entirely.

That's exactly my point; simply having a model consistent with itself and with reality is good enough.

But I'm not granting consistency with reality. It seems to me that science is good enough without demanding that its theories match up to the way things really are. Besides, how could we know such a thing? My suggestion is to drop all talk of "consistency with reality" and, indeed, talk of "reality" itself. I can't see it offering much beyond a rhetoric flourish.

[blowfly]

Nov 30, 2009 18:49:15 GMT dahduh said:

Much of the whole atheist/theist debate revolves around what is 'objectively true'. Given that we perceive a complicated world through a very limited set of senses and are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases, the whole idea of 'objective truth' is a slippery one.

It certainly is. It's probably meaningless in the end, IMO.

So I'd like to offer a very simple definition: Something is objectively true, if and only if there is information associated with it that can be independently obtained.

It all relates to information. If multiple inquirers can extract the same information from something, and do it in a way that is manifestly not from their method of measurement or information previously shared, then that information must be coming from something that can deliver up that information - something that is, by definition, objectively true.

Technically speaking, the conclusion would be intersubjective, rather than objective. But in everyday speech, yes we could call it reasonably objective. This kind of objectivity is a scale, or a gradient, rather than a simple objective/not-objective dichotomy.

[dahduh]

Dec 1, 2009 21:20:04 GMT vazscep said:

Dec 1, 2009 17:31:36 GMT dahduh said:

And that's all we have to do; ensure consistency between the model and reality.

You're going too far there. I said: "It seems to me that all we can do is examine its consistency with itself and our measurements" There is no mention of consistency with reality here. How do you get consistency with reality from consistency with measurement? It appears you are assuming that measurement is reality, but that would be denying theory ladenness entirely.

Sorry, I spoke too loosely; I was trying to separate internal logical consistency of the model, as in free of contradictions, and consistency of the model with measurement. The latter I referred to as "consistency with reality", which was a bad choice of words. I think we're both on the same page here.

That's exactly my point; simply having a model consistent with itself and with reality is good enough.

But I'm not granting consistency with reality. It seems to me that science is good enough without demanding that its theories match up to the way things really are. Besides, how could we know such a thing? My suggestion is to drop all talk of "consistency with reality" and, indeed, talk of "reality" itself. I can't see it offering much beyond a rhetoric flourish.

As noted, it was a badly phrased rhetorical flourish.

But back to the question of theory ladenness and objective truth and connection to 'reality': I think I'm beginning to see the issues more clearly now. The fact that reality injects information into our models suggests that we're not just making stuff up - thus the notion of 'objective truth'. But I would have to call this 'objective' truth, since this information is always seen through the prism of a model - the issue of theory ladenness.

But does this even matter? The important thing is that we get X bits of information from outside the model, and perhaps the interpretation we put on it is more or less irrelevant. If the model is reliable and complete the interpretation is merely a matter of aesthetics. Is that reasonable?